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The core subjects of trade theory are the pattern and volume of trade: which
goods are traded by which countries, and how much of those goods are traded. 
Most of the rest of trade theory, such as the analysis of policy and the effects of
trade on factor prices and welfare, is grounded in models which explain the pattern
and/or volume of trade.  As a consequence, it is impossible to assess the relevance
of trade theory as a whole unless we understand the empirical performance of the
core explanations for trade.
The oldest explanation for the pattern of trade, originally due to Ricardo, is
comparative advantage.  The law of comparative advantage is an unassailable
intellectual cornerstone of economics, but until recently empirical research on it
has been scant and only loosely connected to theory.  In contrast, the law of
gravity as applied to explaining the volume of trade has been the foundation for
literally hundreds of applied studies, but the gravity model has had a
comparatively shallow (if not shaky) theoretical foundation.  This purpose of this
chapter is to review and critique the last decade or so of empirical research on
comparative advantage and gravity. 
The first part of the chapter discusses evidence on comparative advantage,
with an emphasis on carefully connecting theory models to data analyses.  The
second part of the chapter first considers the theoretical foundations of the gravity
model, and then reviews the small number of papers that have tried to test, rather
than simply use, the implications of gravity.  Both parts of the paper yield the1 Stronger statements, such as “a country will export all goods which are
cheaper in autarky, and import all other goods”, are not possible except in
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same conclusion: we are still in the very early stages of empirically understanding
specialization and the volume of trade, but the work that has been done can serve
as a starting point for further research.
1 Testing the General Theory of Comparative Advantage
Economists are proud of the theory of comparative advantage, seeing it as
both beautiful and profound: beautiful because of its simplicity and elegance,
profound because it is surprising and has deep implications for economic policy
and our understanding of real economies.  
But is the theory of comparative advantage actually useful for helping
understand the world?  The most fundamental problem about comparative
advantage is that it relates observables (trade flows and specialization patterns) to
things which are by their nature almost always unobservable (autarky prices).  For
example, in Deardorff's definitive modern statement of the theory (1980), the
general theorem of comparative advantage for a single country is stated as 
The value of net exports evaluated at autarky prices is non-positive
(Deardorff 1980, pg.  948).
The assumptions required to prove this result are standard but minimalist: they
include convex technology, perfect competition, and the existence of community
indifference curves.  Tariffs and transport costs are allowed, but not trade
subsidies.  Like all statements of the theory of comparative advantage, Deardorff’s
is a comparative general equilibrium result: allowing all goods and factor markets
to clear simultaneously, it expresses a relationship that must hold between an
endogenous variable in one equilibrium (autarky prices) and an endogenous
variable in another equilibrium (net exports)
1.restricted models.
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If it were possible to test this theory there would be a lot at stake. The most
interesting reasons why the prediction could fail include non-convex technology
and/or imperfect competition, as well as perverse trade policies such as export
subsidies.  Alternatively, markets simply might not work the way we think they
do. In short, failure or confirmation of the law of comparative advantage would be
very interesting for theorists as well as policy-makers. 
Perhaps surprisingly given the general invisibility of autarky prices, there
are two recent papers which offer evidence on the relationship between autarky
prices and trade flows. The first of these is “An Experimental Investigation of the
Patterns of International Trade" by Noussair, Plott, and Riezman (1995) . 
Noussair et al run laboratory experiments that are intended to satisfy the
assumptions of comparative advantage theory.  The experimental economy has
two countries and two goods, with given linear production functions that differ
across countries and identical preferences for all agents.  The experimental
subjects are undergraduates at Cal Tech and the University of Iowa. The autarky
and free trade equilibria in this economy can be easily computed analytically, so
the purpose of the experiment is to see how close the data is to the analytical
equilibrium.  Before considering the results, it is worth asking what can possibly
be learned from this exercise.  The authors themselves pose the question
Since the world's international economies are vastly more
complicated than the economies created for this study, of what
relevance are laboratory data?  (NPR, pg. 462)
The author's don't satisfactorily answer this query.  Their best attempt at an answer
is4
The preconditions for the operations of the principles [of comparative
advantage] have been introduced by the experimenters.  The
experiments are able to provide some insights into how models [...]
are able to organize the data, given that the situation is one in which
the model can meaningfully be applied.  The experiment cannot,
however, answer the equally important questions about the relative
likelihood that nature has created a situation for which the parametric
and institutional features of the model are relevant (NPR, pg.  464).
Despite the poor writing, this passage illuminates what the contribution of the
paper is.  The paper is really about how markets work, about whether they can
effectively exploit all the gains from trade that we know are there.  It is hard to see
how any experimental result could affect our view of the relevance of comparative
advantage.  The authors' results show that production, trade, and prices converge
to the correct values, and they argue that the process of convergence is informative
about how markets work.  In particular, the paper has an extensive discussion of
dynamics and the process of convergence to the full general equilibrium.  This
may be of interest to theorists but has little relevance for the applicability of the
theory of comparative advantage.
In contrast to Noussair et al, Bernhofen and Brown (2000) provide actual
historical evidence on the relationship between autarky prices and trade through
an examination of Japan's opening to trade in the 1860s. This is a well-executed
paper in several ways.  First, the authors correctly apply Deardorff's (1980)
general statement of the theory of comparative advantage.  Second, they argue
carefully and (to this non-expert) convincingly that Japan in the mid-19th century
met the requirements needed to apply the theory: Japan was completely closed to
trade before 1854, and had fairly free trade (in particular, no export subsidies) by
the late 1860s. They also recognize the biggest potential problem with applying
the comparative advantage prediction to this episode: prices within Japan might2 A further condition which they do not mention is that tastes must have
stayed the same.
3 The paper chooses a normalization for prices such that the magnitude by
which the Deardorff condition is satisfied is uninformative.  The authors tell me
that the next version of the paper will express this magnitude relative to autarky
GDP, giving a measure of the size of the gains from trade. 
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have changed between 1854 and 1870 even in the absence of the opening to trade. 
The requirements for using 1854 prices in a test of comparative advantage are that
economic growth was unrelated to trade, and that growth was not biased in favor
of exportables
2. They make a plausible historical case that these conditions held
true.  A short table confirms that the Deardorff condition is satisfied: Japan's trade
was correctly predicted by her autarky prices
3.
Bernhofen and Brown argue that, besides being closed to trade before 1854
and having no export subsidies after opening up, Japan's economy was fairly
competitive before and after opening to trade.  Does this mean that their results
were foreordained?  No. As Noussair et al emphasize, just because the competitive
and technological conditions of an economy satisfy the assumptions of the theory
doesn't mean that the post-trade equilibrium will satisfy the law of comparative
advantage - after all, humans and their institutions work in mysterious ways.  Put
differently, if the data had violated the law of comparative advantage, would it
have shaken our faith in the theory? Yes: given the evidence that the authors
provide about the structure of the Japanese economy in the mid-nineteenth
century, Japan's trade should have been predicted by autarky prices, and if it hadn't
we would have had to explain why. The fact that the post-trade general
equilibrium behaved as expected is genuine news, and is evidence for the
relevance of the theory of comparative advantage.  The result is particularly
interesting because it involves a large country which became one of the greatest
trading nations ever.  
In short, the standard view that the theory of comparative advantage has
never been tested needs to be modified: with Bernhofen and Brown's contribution,6
we now have one paper that tests a very general version of comparative advantage,
and comparative advantage passes.  I think I can speak for many economists who
have taught this theory with great fervor when I say "thank goodness".  
2 Testing Classical and Neoclassical Models
Bernhofen and Brown is the exception to the rule: for all other
contemporary and historical trading economies, we have no evidence on autarky
prices. As a consequence, any application of comparative advantage theory must
have an intermediate step between autarky prices and trade, one that relates
autarky prices to observable features of economies. This means that empirical
researchers must usually model production possibilities and preferences. In this
section I discuss recent empirical work on these models, but first I will lay out a
general model of comparative advantage that can be used to frame the discussion.
2.1 The Neoclassical Theory Of Production and Trade
Comparative advantage is a property of what I will call neoclassical trade
models. These models all have at least two goods (so that there is a potential
motive for trade), factors which are mobile between alternative uses, convex
technology, and perfectly competitive markets for goods and factors. The
equilibrium conditions for such economies include zero profit conditions for each
sector:
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function for good g given the technology and factor prices w
c that prevail in
country c. Constant returns to scale implies that the unit cost functions can be
rewritten as
(2)
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where each   is the cost-minimizing amount of factor f used to produce one unit
c
fg a
of good g,  which depends on w
c.  Collecting all the zero profit conditions together4 If G > F, then any F equations from (3) can be used to solve for the F
factor prices; the other G-F equations will be consistent by assumption.
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where the F × G matrix of cost-minimizing input coefficients A
c depends on w
c.
The other production side equilibrium conditions are that all factors v, which are
in fixed aggregate supply, are fully employed. For a given factor f in country c, full
employment is written as
f = 1,...,F (4) 11 22 ...
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Collecting all F full-employment conditions together gives
v
c ! "
F (5) cc c vA x =
The system given by (3) and (5) is F+G equations in the F+2G unknown factor
prices, output levels, and output prices. 
Even at this level of generality, and before specifying G extra equations
required to close the model, we can say something interesting about these
economies. First, if there are at least as many goods as factors, G # F, then it is
possible to solve the zero-profit conditions in (3) for factor prices as a function






This result, labeled “factor price insensitivity”or FPI by Leamer (1995), is
remarkable: factor prices do not depend directly on factor supplies, and if country
c is small (so that producer prices are determined in world markets that are
unaffected by the output of country c),  then factor prices are completely5 For many decades until Leamer coined the term, the FPI result did not
have its own name, and the result was often misleadingly referred to as “factor
price equalization” or FPE. The terminology matters in this case, because true FPE
- that is, the same factor prices in different countries - requires more assumptions
(including frictionless trade and identical technology) than FPI, which is a
property of any single economy. Succinctly, FPI is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for FPE.
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independent of domestic factor supplies
5. Note also that FPI implies that the
equilibrium technique matrix A
c will be independent of factor supplies if  G # F,
since unit costs depend only on factor prices.
We can also say some interesting things about the relationship between
factor supplies and outputs. First, if there are exactly as many goods as factors,
then A
c is both independent of factor supplies and square, which means it can be
inverted.  Premultiplying both sides of (5) by this inverse gives
,( 7 )
1 ()
cc c xA v
− =
which is to say that industry outputs are a locally linear function of economy-wide
factor supplies.  With more goods than factors, G > F,  A
c is not invertible: there
are many output vectors which satisfy full employment, and which one will obtain
in equilibrium will depend on goods market equilibrium conditions.  If G < F , you
might be tempted to think that you could take any G equations from (5) and solve
for outputs without reference to the zero-profit conditions (6); the error in that
thinking is that with G < F the equilibrium techniques are not independent of
factor supplies. In the G < F case, outputs are determinate, but they can’t be solved
for independently of the zero profit conditions.
Closing the model under autarky requires G goods-market equilibrium
conditions, while with trade the G prices are given by global market clearing. With
national income Y
c a function of producer prices and factor supplies, 
, (9) (,) (,)
cc c cc c c Yp v wp v v =⋅
we can define the national indirect utility function  , where (,)
ccc Up Y !6 I am deliberately noncommital here about how trade policy causes
differences between consumer and producer prices. I also ignore the value of trade
policy revenue (tariff revenue plus quota rents) in national income, and dismiss the
possibility of aggregate trade imbalances, to keep the notation simple.
7 Woodland (1982) offers an especially clear and detailed development of
the dual approach. For a more compact, if opaque, treatment see Dixit and Norman
(1980).
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is the vector of consumer prices as a function of producer (,)
cc c c pp p τ = !!
prices and trade policy instruments   
6. With the normalization that the marginal
c τ
utility of income is unity, Roy’s identity gives the Marshallian demands
as the negative of the marginal indirect utilities: (,)
ccc
g ep Y !
, e
c ! "
G (10) (,) (,)
ccc ccc
p ep Y Up Y =− ∇ !!
With the consumption and production sides of the model specified, it is trivial to
write down the net export vector t
c as the difference between the two:
(11) (,,) (,) (,(,) )
ccc c cc c ccc cc tppv xpv ep Yvp =− !!
The fact that the determination of net exports can be separated into the
determination of production and consumption is very far from being a trivial
result, and does not generalize to most models with increasing returns and/or
imperfect competition: under most such models, output and consumption must be
determined jointly (see Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Fujita, Krugman, and
Venables (1999)).
The development of the production model of equations (3) and (5) uses
primal cost functions, and is useful for understanding the properties of the
resulting equilibrium. But if all one is interested in is the equilibrium outputs and
factor prices, then the model can be stated much more compactly using duality
7.
Under constant returns and perfect competition, national income is given by8 Although the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem doesn’t generalize, the result that
countries will export the services of their abundant factors does generalize to
10
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where   is the compact set of feasible net outputs. Equilibrium outputs and ()
cc Yv
factor prices are then given by
(13) (,)
cc c c
p xr p v ∈∇
(14) (,)
cc c c
v wr p v =∇
Note that the gradient in (13) is a set, reflecting the indeterminacy in general of the
output vector which will maximize national income. As indicated above, this
indeterminacy disappears if G $ F with no joint production, and we can
differentiate the output vector with respect to factor supplies to get
(15)
2 (,) [(,) ]
c c cc c c cc c
pv x rpv v Rpv v  =∇ ⋅ = ⋅ 




locally independent of factor supplies, and we just have a restatement of equation
(7). The notation R
c is chosen to evoke the Rybczynski theorem, since the
elements of R
c give the general equilibrium response of outputs to factor supplies.
What can be said in general about R
c? First, except in the case of G=F=2
and no joint production, there is no necessary connection between a sector’s factor
intensity and its output response to a factor supply increase; for example, it is
possible in general that the most capital intensive sector will shrink when capital
becomes more abundant. A corollary is that it is impossible to generalize the
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem beyond the 2×2 case: a country will not necessarily
export goods that intensively use their abundant factors, even if every other
condition of the theorem is satisfied
8.  higher dimensions. See the chapter by Davis and Weinstein for a discussion of the
research on this so-called Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek hypothesis.
9 The easiest way to understand this argument is to visualize the textbook
two-good, one factor Ricardian model. If relative prices equal relative labor
productivities, both goods will be produced in indeterminate quantities, and
increases in labor will have unpredictable effects on outputs. But if prices change
even slightly, the economy will specialize completely in the good whose relative
price has risen, and there will be a unique relationship between labor supply
changes and output changes.
10 The simplest example comes from the textbook specific factors model:
accumulation of the mobile factor causes both industries to expand.
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Second, for G>F, we can’t say anything about R
c because it doesn’t exist
due to the indeterminacy of output. This is alarming from an empirical point of
view, but many theorists have argued that this case is irrelevant, since even tiny
price changes will result in G-F industries shutting down, leaving the economy
with G=F
9. This is a cute theoretical argument, but does not settle the case
empirically.
Third, some important results are available for the general G$F case. A
natural extension of the 2×2 production structure is to suppose that every sector
uses at least two factors, and that there is no joint production. As Jones and
Scheinkman (1977) show, with these assumptions and G=F, then when a factor
supply rises, at least one industry will expand more rapidly than the factor, and at
least one industry will contract. To state the result more colorfully, in this “even”
case every factor is a friend to at least one industry and an enemy to another. In the
uneven case of G<F this result does not hold: an increase in a factor supply may
cause all outputs to rise; a factor may be so good-natured that it is a friend to all
and an enemy to none
10. But the converse does not hold: for every industry, there
is at least one factor whose accumulation will cause it to decline. That is, every
industry has an enemy.
This is a rich set of important and testable empirical predictions. If every
industry has an enemy, there are clear political economy implications: there will12
be political opponents to policies favoring the accumulation of some factors. The
opposite can be said for factors which are friends to all: such factors are likely to
face less opposition in the quest for favorable treatment. The effects of factor
accumulation are also of interest to policymakers wishing to forecast the future
sectoral composition of output.  Empirically, there are several points to emphasize.
First, the identification of friends and enemies can not be accomplished just by
looking at input cost shares. Second, the assumption of no joint production is
crucial: with joint production the magnification results in even models do not
hold, and the strong friends and enemies results can not be expected. Third, very
little can be said if G>F: there may be no systematic relationship between relative
factor supplies and the composition of output.
Most of the above discussion has concerned equilibrium in a single
economy. Without putting further restrictions on how technology and tastes vary
across countries, the model can not say much about trade or international
differences in outputs and factor prices. The generalized Heckscher-Ohlin
approach (what I will call the factor-proportions model) to making cross-country
predictions is to assume away all international differences in technology and
preferences. Further assuming that preferences are homothetic (so that
consumption shares don’t depend on income), the equation (11) prediction for
trade simplifies to
(16) (,,) (,) ()
c c cc cc c c
p tppv r pv e p Y =∇ − ⋅ !! !
where   is a vector of consumption budget shares. In (16), the output and
G e∈ ! "
consumption functions are the same across countries (the c superscripts have
disappeared from r(%) and e(%)), and so could in principal be estimated with cross
country data. The prediction can be simplified further by assuming frictionless
trade (so that  ) , G=F , and that endowments are sufficiently close
cc ppp == !11 Together these assumptions are sufficient for trade to reproduce an
“integrated equilibrium” with determinate production.  The integrated equilibrium
is the allocation which would result in a world with no barriers to the movement of
goods or factors. See Dixit and Norman (1980). 
12 In a series of well-done papers, Markusen (1986), Hunter and Markusen
(1988), and Hunter (1991) explore the role of non-homothetic preferences in
explaining gross trade volumes.
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together so that all countries produce the same goods
11. By equation (6), this
means that factor prices and hence production techniques will be the same across
countries. By equation (7), outputs will vary linearly with factor supplies.
Considering (16) as a cross-section prediction at a point in time means that there is
no variation in prices, so we can write the prediction for a country’s trade as
(17) (, )
cc c c c tvY R v e Y =⋅− ⋅ !
In words, trade depends only on relative factor supplies and country size.
This is an elegant prediction, and a version of it was investigated
empirically in Edward Leamer's landmark 1984 book (Leamer, 1984).  But the
elegance of (17) comes at a high price in terms of empirically dubious
assumptions, and much of the empirical work on the neoclassical trade model
during the past decade has been aimed at relaxing some of these assumptions
without giving up the ability to make cross-country inferences.
The assumption of identical homothetic preferences (IHP) used to derive
(17) is implausible, and uninteresting in the sense that there is no real theory
behind it.  Rather, the IHP assumption is just an analytical simplification used to
translate the Rybczynski relationship (the mapping from endowments into outputs)
into the Heckscher-Ohlin relationship (the mapping from endowments into net
exports).  An empirical rejection of IHP would rightly have no impact on our view
of the underlying production model, although it could be interesting for other
reasons
12.  
Another reason to be uninterested in IHP is that it treats all demand for 14
traded goods as coming directly from the demand for final consumption goods.
Intermediate products are readily introduced into the production model and have
no implications for the production model results mentioned above, as long as we
make the distinction between net and gross outputs. But allowing for trade in
intermediate goods means that there will be no simple relationship between net
exports and national income, even if IHP holds. Since a very large share of the
volume of trade is intermediate goods, and essentially all imports require some
domestic value added before they enter final consumption (see Rousslang and To
(1993)), a more plausible simple model for trade would be that all trade is in
intermediate goods, rather than none as assumed by the models that yield
equations (11), (16) and (17).
2.2 When worlds collide: data meets the neoclassical model
Whatever assumptions are made about the demand for traded goods, no
cross-country predictions can be made without taking a stand on how technology
and prices vary across countries. The Leamer (1984) assumptions of identical
technology, frictionless trade, and G=F  lead to a very simple prediction: for each










This is the model estimated by Harrigan (1995). The empirical model in that paper
considers ten large manufacturing sectors and four factor supplies: capital, skilled
and unskilled labor, and land. For each industry, Harrigan analyzes a panel of 20
OECD countries and 16 years, using three different strategies for pooling over
time: generalized least squares with and without fixed country effects, and a time-
varying parameter model. Even the fixed effects model has substantial residual
autocorrelation, while the non-fixed-effects models all have first-order
autoregressive parameters in excess of 0.9. This means that the parameters of the15
model are identified mainly from time series within-country variation - an
unfortunate fact since the main interest is in explaining the cross-country
distribution of production.  
A striking result from Harrigan (1995) is that every industry was found to
have at least one enemy, a factor whose abundance and/or accumulation leads to a
decline in output (the enemy is usually skilled or unskilled labor, sometimes land).
Capital is manufacturing’s friend: it is estimated to have a positive effect on output
for all ten industries in each specification. Despite the fact that Leamer (1984)
used a cross-section of trade data, in contrast to a panel of output data, the
inferences about comparative advantage are similar.
Although factor supplies are jointly statistically significant in each
regression, the model does poorly in explaining the cross-sectional variation in the
data, with large within-sample prediction errors. Harrigan identifies a number of
potential explanations for this poor fit (including bad data, scale economies, and
government policy) but doesn’t mention other possibilities (such as indeterminacy
in production, technology differences, different product mixes, or price differences
caused by trade policy or transport costs). It seems fair to say that the factor
proportions view of the world has mixed support from this paper: a poor overall
fit, but fairly solid evidence of a systematic relationship between outputs and
relative endowments.
Several papers have been at least partially motivated by the mixed results of
Harrigan (1995). Bernstein and Weinstein (1998) focus on the question of output
indeterminacy when G>F. They correctly note that this is an empirical question
which has little to do with counting the numbers of goods and factors in any
particular empirical exercise. They begin by noting that, with identical technology, 
frictionless trade, endowments which are not too far apart, and G#F, then the full
employment conditions (5) will have the same A matrix for all c:
(19) cc vA x =
They call this the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek or HOV model. If, in addition, G is16
exactly equal to F, then outputs are the same linear function R of endowments for
all c, and as noted above R = A
-1. They express this implication as
AR = IF (20)
where IF is the identity matrix of dimension F.
Using data from Japanese regions, they confirm that (19) holds, which
indicates that techniques and factor prices are the same in all Japanese regions. 
This is not a trivial finding: it rules out increasing returns at the level of industries,
and/or technological differences across regions.  They also argue that it rules out
G<F, but that is wrong: with intra-Japan mobility of factors, factor prices and
techniques will be equalized regardless of the relative number of goods and
factors.  Despite the fact that (19) holds for Japanese regions, (20) fails miserably:
outputs are not well-explained statistically by endowments alone, and the linear
restrictions embodied in (20) are rejected.  From this they conclude that G>F and
output indeterminacy is an empirically important fact about general equilibrium
production.
They then apply (19) to international data, multiplying the Japanese A
matrix by national output vectors x to get predicted national endowments v:
predicted 
c Japan c vAx =
These predicted endowments are not at all close to actual measured endowments,
which leads them to reject the assumption that all countries produce the same
goods using the same techniques.  This result, while not new (see the chapter by
Davis and Weinstein in this volume for more evidence that techniques vary
internationally), is nonetheless worth noting, since it suggests that economists
should abandon the simple HOV model of international production.
Abandoning HOV is one thing, but replacing it with something else is
another.  One of the most appealing aspects of empirical work based on the even
model pioneered by Leamer (1984) is that every parameter estimated has a clear
structural interpretation.  The challenge for researchers wishing to improve on this
framework is to develop empirically implementable models which are equally13 See the chapter by Davis and Weinstein in this volume for details on these
modeling strategies.
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closely tied to theory, but that relax the stringent assumptions used to derive
equations like (17) and (18).  In the factor content literature, this has been
accomplished using restrictive models of international technology differences
(Trefler 1993, 1995) or two-factor models where factor price equalization fails
(Davis and Weinstein 1998)
13.  These models may or may not be appropriate for
studies of the factor content of trade, but they are too restrictive for studying
comparative advantage, as they rule out all but very special types of cross-country
technology differences.  In searching for amendments to the factor proportions
model, it is natural to consider general technology differences as a source of
comparative advantage, not least because there is extensive evidence that, even
among advanced economies, technology differences are large, ubiquitous, and
non-transitory (see, inter alia, Jorgenson, Kuroda, and Nishimizu (1987),
Jorgenson and Kuroda (1990), Dollar, Baumol and Wolff (1988), Dollar and
Wolff (1993),  van Ark (1993), van Ark and Pilat (1993), and Harrigan (1997b,
1999)).
Harrigan (1997a) points out that using the dual, rather than the primal,
representation of aggregate technology makes it possible to estimate more general
models of specialization.  Harrigan assumes that technological differences across
countries are Hicks-neutral and industry specific.  This can be incorporated into
the revenue function approach in a very straightforward way:
, (21) (,) ( ,)
cc c c c c rpv r pv θ = {} 1 ,...,
cc c
G diag θθ θ =
where   is a scalar productivity parameter which gives the level of technology in
c
g θ
industry g of country c relative to productivity in a base country. This is a natural
extension of the classical one-factor Ricardian model, and it has the virtue that the
technology parameters are, in principle, measurable by applying the theory of total
factor productivity (TFP) measurement.  The usual derivative property applies to14 This is the model preferred by Trefler (1995) in his study of the factor
content of trade.
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(21), so that outputs are given by the gradient of (21) with respect to prices:
(22) (, )
cc c c
p xr p v θ =∇
Note that if there are no cross-country differences in relative industry technology
levels, that is   , then (by the homogeneity of the revenue function)
cc
g g θθ =∀
technology differences become a scalar shift parameter, giving outputs as 
(23) (,) (,)
cc c c c c xpv x pv θ =
Equation (23) illustrates that technology differences which are neutral across
sectors affect absolute, but not comparative, advantage
14. 
To implement the model given by (22), Harrigan (1997a) follows Kohli
(1991) and assumes that the revenue function (21) can be adequately
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where  is the share of good g value added in country c's GDP at time t, the a's
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and r's are parameters to be estimated, and  has a panel structure with fixed
c
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country and time effects to account for other unobservable influences on
specialization.  There are a number of notable features of this specification.  First,
it allows Harrigan to simultaneously estimate the impact of Ricardian and
Heckscher-Ohlin influences on specialization.  Second, since the same technology
parameters appear in each equation, it is possible to calculate cross-TFP effects on
output shares, which is a key general equilibrium channel.  Third, the estimated
results do not directly tell us whether each sector has an enemy, in the sense of a15It is straightforward to compute the effects on levels, rather than shares, of
output, but Harrigan does not do this.
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factor that causes its output to decline in absolute terms, although the r's tell us
which factors raise or lower a good's share of national income
15.  Fourth, because
of the use of country fixed effects, all of the model's parameters are identified by
within-country time series variation.  Fifth, the specification of the model requires
no assumption about any form of factor price equalization - this is one of the
benefits of using a dual rather than primal approach.
Harrigan's results support the view that non-neutral technology differences
are important for specialization. For most sectors, the own-TFP effects are
positive, statistically significant, and large.  The largest effect is in the biggest
sector, Machinery: a 10 percent improvement in relative Machinery TFP raises
that sector's share of GDP by around 0.25 percentage points.  As an example of the
cross-TFP effects, technological progress in Machinery comes at the expense of
the Chemicals and Metals sectors, whose share of GDP declines.  The inferences
about factor supplies are roughly consistent with Harrigan (1995) and Leamer
(1984): accumulation of producer durables and High-School educated workers
generally lead to expanding manufacturing sectors, while growth in structures and
highly educated workers are associated with declining manufacturing.  These
findings suggest a simple story: the service sector is intensive in non-residential
construction (office buildings and retail stores) and college-educated workers
(managers, professionals, educators), so that abundance in these factors draws
other resources out of manufacturing and into the service sector. By contrast, the
manufacturing sectors are intensive in producer durables and medium-educated
workers, so that abundance in these factors draws resources out of services and
into manufacturing sectors. While plausible, confirmation of this explanation
would require data on direct factor shares which are not easily available in
internationally comparable form. 
Harrigan (1997a) fruitfully extends the literature on comparative advantage20
in one direction, by abandoning the Heckscher-Ohlin assumption that countries
share the same technology.  Another problematic feature of the standard factor
proportions approach is the assumption that all countries produce the same goods
and have the same factor prices. This "one cone" assumption is explicit in Leamer
(1984),  Harrigan (1995), and Bernstein and Weinstein (1998), as well as in most
of the factor content literature (with the notable exception of Davis and Weinstein
1998).   Absolute factor price equalization is easy to reject by direct observation: it
would be hard to explain mass migration from the South to the North if wages
were the same everywhere.  In the factor content literature, the assumption of
equal factor prices in levels is sometimes replaced with the weaker assumption
that relative factor prices are equalized (see Trefler 1995).  Equal relative factor
prices implies that, for a given sector across countries, input coefficients are
constant and in particular do not vary with aggregate endowments (this is just a
corollary of factor price insensitivity).  This hypothesis can be tested by a simple









where the left-hand side is the capital-labor ratio in industry g in country c, which
is regressed on an industry constant and country c's aggregate capital-labor ratio. 
Under the one-cone/FPI hypothesis, ! = 0. There is ample evidence that this is not
the case: Dollar, Wolff, and Baumol (1988, Table 2.3) show that capital per
worker in individual industries is highly correlated with capital per worker in
aggregate manufacturing.  More recently, Davis and Weinstein (1998, Table 1)
show the same thing, finding that techniques are strongly correlated with
aggregate endowments. 
A finding that ! > 0 in equation (25) can be explained by a failure of factor
price equalization (FPE).  Retaining the Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions of16 Schott's model in a more general form dates back at least to Deardorff
(1979).
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frictionless trade, perfect competition, and identical technology across countries,
FPE fails when countries have endowments which are too far apart, and as a result
countries produce different goods, the so-called "multi-cone" equilibrium.  The
fact that we do not observe such specialization in the output statistics may simply
be because different goods are lumped together into the same industrial
classification. If this were true, then the sign of the Rybczynski effects of
endowments on observed output aggregates would differ systematically across
countries, and one-cone empirical models like Harrigan (1995) would be
misspecified.
By using a dual approach, Harrigan (1997a) skirts this issue, but the general
sprit of that paper is a one-cone model, since the translog approximation is
assumed to be valid at all points in the sample.  Schott (2000) tackles the multi-
cone issue directly, and develops an  empirical model where the set of produced
goods and the associated Rybczynski effects depend on relative factor supplies. 
Schott's theoretical model is a standard one of two factors (capital and labor),
many goods whose techniques of production are independent of factor prices, and
many countries
16.  The equilibrium of this model has every country producing just

















to be the fixed capital-labor ratio of good g and the capital-labor endowment of
country c respectively, and number goods in order of increasing capital intensity,
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where the r's are positive constants. In words, if a country's capital-labor ratio lies
between kg-1 and kg, then capital accumulation leads to an increase in the output of
good g, and the opposite if k
c lies between kg and kg+1.  If k
c does not lie between kg-
1 and kg+1, then country c will not produce any of good g at all; it will be producing
the two goods closest to its aggregate capital-labor ratio instead. 
Now imagine that a particular industrial classification includes two or more
goods with quite different capital intensities (for example, Textiles includes low-
quality cotton cloth as well as high-tech synthetic fibers).  With such aggregation
of goods within a single classification, the Rybczynski effect of capital on output
of the aggregate may switch sign more than once: at very low k
c the Rybczynski
effect is positive, then it becomes negative as countries move out of the labor
intensive good, then positive again as production of the capital intensive good
commences, etc.  In this case trying to infer the effect of endowments on outputs
by pooling across countries with very different endowments is a hopeless muddle:
any estimated slopes will be a mix of effects of varying size and sign, and will
have no structural interpretation.
Schott pursues two strategies for dealing with the complexities of multiple
cones and multiple goods aggregated into a single category.  The first is to take the
existing output aggregates and estimate a piece-wise linear relationship between
outputs and endowments.  In this model, Schott simultaneously estimates the
Rybczynski effects along with the capital-labor ratios at which the effects change. 23
Schott uncovers four cones, which is to say that for each output aggregate, four
Rybczynski effects are estimated at different point in the sample.  This is an
intricate empirical model and in the end is not too convincing, as the fitted and
actual output levels are not at all close to each other, and the points at which the
slopes change sign seem heavily influenced by a very small number of
observations (see Schott (2000), Figure 3). 
Schott's second empirical strategy is more promising.  Rather than work
with the usual output aggregates, he constructs three of his own aggregates based
on the capital intensity of each country-industry observation.  Since (as ! > 0 in
equation (25) verifies)  sectoral capital intensities are correlated with aggregate
capital abundance, Schott's "Heckscher-Ohlin aggregates" group together products
in different output categories which are produced by countries with similar capital
abundance.  For example, Apparel produced in Guatemala is lumped together with
Electrical Machinery produced in the Phillippines, while Swedish Apparel is
lumped together with Transport Equipment produced in Malaysia.  
Using these three HO aggregates and estimating a version of equation (26),
Schott finds what the multi-cone reasoning above suggests: the effect of capital
accumulation on the least-capital intensive aggregate is at first negative then zero,
the effect is first positive and then negative for the middle aggregate, and is first
zero and then positive for the third aggregate.  In other words, he identifies two
cones: in the first cone, countries produce the Low and Middle capital-intensive
HO aggregates, and in the second cone countries produce the Middle and High
capital intensive HO aggregates. There is some circularity in this procedure, since
country capital abundance is in effect used to construct the HO aggregates, making
it unsurprising (for example) that capital abundant countries specialize in the
capital intensive aggregate. Schott's results are also suspect  because he uses total
capital within manufacturing, rather than aggregate capital, to measure a country's
overall capital-labor ratio; this means he is ignoring capital re-allocation between
manufacturing and the rest of the economy.  A broader criticism is that Schott's24
theoretical model is quite special and is taken perhaps too literally as a framework
for data analysis; Leamer (1987), in contrast, also works with a multiple-cone
model but regards the piece-wise linearity between outputs and endowments
implied by the model to be too special to take seriously.  Schott also completely
ignores the issue of technology differences, which Harrigan (1997) showed to be
important for specialization. Despite these caveats, Schott's study is important for
two reasons: it provides some evidence that multiple cones are empirically
important, and it forces us to think seriously about the heterogeneity lurking
within measured aggregate outputs.
Harrigan and Zakrajšek (2000) consider the multiple-cone issue as well as
several other open questions about specialization.  As noted above, Harrigan
(1997a) measures productivity differences using TFP indices (which, because of
data availability, restricts the sample to OECD countries), and estimates a fixed-
effects model of specialization that does not use any of the cross-country variation
in the sample.  Motivated by these limitations of  Harrigan (1997a), Harrigan and
Zakrajšek develop an empirical model which permits consistent estimation of the
effects of factor endowments on specialization while allowing for unobservable
technology differences.  This allows them to analyze a larger number of countries
(including a few from Latin America and East Asia), and to exploit the cross-
section variation in the data.  Their identifying assumption is that, except for
country and time effects, any non-neutrality in technology differences is
orthogonal to factor supplies.  As in Harrigan (1997a), they adopt a dual-translog
approach which allows them to avoid making any assumptions about factor price












If the country effects  are also assumed to be orthogonal to factor supplies, then
c
g β25
it is possible to use a random-effects estimator which combines the time-series and
cross-country variation in the sample.  They also report fixed effects estimates
(which use only the time-series variation) and between estimates (which use only
cross-country variation) of (27). 
Unlike most other papers in this literature, Harrigan and Zakrajšek also
consider alternative hypotheses.  The statistical alternative they consider is simple,
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where  is measured as real GDP per worker.  This reduced form relationship
c
t θ
can be loosely derived from a product cycle model, where new goods are first
produced in rich countries and are later produced in poorer countries as
technology is transferred.  It can also capture multiple cone effects in a flexible
way: models such as Schott's would predict an important role for the second-order
term as countries move into and out of goods based on their overall per-capita
income.
Harrigan and Zakrajšek find that estimating (27) gives a noisy but fairly
consistent story about industrial specialization: human and physical capital
abundance raise output in the heavy industrial sectors, while physical capital
lowers output in food and apparel-textiles. The model has little success in
explaining variation in output in the smaller, more resource-based sectors,
probably because they have no measurements of resource abundance.  Turning to
the alternative model (28), results are roughly in line with what would have been
expected from the factor proportions results: higher aggregate productivity is
associated with lower output of food and higher output in the heavy industrial
sectors (fabricated metals and the three machinery categories). 
What about multiple cones?  Following Schott's line of reasoning, this
should show up in parameter instability across different regions of relative factor26
supply space. Harrigan and Zakrajšek used a number of formal and informal
strategies to find evidence of such instability and found nothing.  They did find
some weak evidence of quadratic effects in equation (28), but the nonlinearity was
only economically important for a single sector, Food.
The bottom line from Harrigan and Zakrajšek (2000) is consistent with the
message which has been developed in all of the papers reviewed in this section, as
well as the factor content literature reviewed in this volume by Davis and
Weinstein: 
Relative factor endowments have a large influence on specialization,
in ways that are consistent with theory and stylized facts about the
international economy. However, factor endowments leave much that
is unexplained: there is a great degree of country-specific
idiosyncracy in specialization patterns, and there is also a great deal
of noise (Harrigan and Zakrajšek (2000), page 23.)
2.3 What about Ricardo?
The papers discussed in the previous section all work with variants of multi-
factor models that have roots in the Heckscher-Ohlin tradition.  This might seem
odd to a reader familiar only with a much earlier literature on testing trade models,
which concluded that Heckscher-Ohlin did very poorly (Leontief 1954) while
Ricardo did quite well (MacDougall 1951, 1952).  Empirical research on the static
Ricardian model was quiescent for nearly three decades after Balassa's last word
on the subject (Balassa 1963).  In the last few years, however, there have been a
few papers on the Ricardian model, including the innovative work by Eaton and
Kortum (2001) which is discussed in the context of the gravity equation below. 
Here I will discuss two recent papers that are very much in the spirit of
MacDougall and Balassa.
Golub and Hsieh (2000) argue that a focus on labor productivity variation as
the source of comparative advantage is appropriate because other factors of
production (such as capital and raw materials) are internationally mobile.  This is27
an oft-heard argument which has at least two problems with it.  First, it risks
confusing free trade in financial assets with easy mobility of physical capital
goods.  What is relevant for comparative advantage is how easily productive
factors are reallocated across alternative uses; the ownership of factors is relevant
to the level of national income but not to the composition of national product. 
Despite the vast and rapid international flows of financial capital, I know of no
evidence which suggests that physical capital is as easily reallocated
internationally as it is intranationally.  To make my point transparent, observe that
structures are an important component of the capital stock which are immobile
even within countries, never mind across borders, while ownership of structures
can easily be transferred internationally.  The same point can be made with
reference to natural resource stocks: land can not move, but its ownership can. 
The point is not to insist that physical capital and land are sources of comparative
advantage, but to insist that it is an empirical question.  Furthermore, the evidence
reviewed in the preceding section suggests that non-labor endowments are
relevant to specialization.
These objections notwithstanding, a case can be made that the Ricardian
concept of output per worker may be what matters for comparative advantage. 
First, labor's share of manufacturing value added is quite high, meaning that labor
productivity is closely linked to total factor productivity.  Second, if differences in
labor productivity reflect technological differences, then labor productivity will be
a good predictor of specialization.  This is the hypothesis that Golub and Hsieh
investigate.  
Golub and Hsieh do not derive their specification directly from a well-
specified model, appealing instead to the earlier literature.  This makes it
impossible to interpret their results in a structural fashion, but the general idea is
intuitive: if relative productivity in sector g in country c is higher than it is in the
average sector in country c, then c specializes in g.  An illustrative equation is28
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where Xgc is a measure of export success in good g for country c, agc is output per
worker in sector g in country c, "gbc is a residual, and # and ! are parameters.  The
equation is pooled across goods g (and possibly across country pairs), and a
positive value of ! is taken as confirmation of the hypothesis that labor
productivity determines comparative advantage.
The problem with specifications such as (29) is not just the usual one of a
missing alternative hypothesis, which plagues most work on comparative
advantage.  Rather, the problem is that there is nothing inherently general
equilibrium about the specification.  Equation (29) simply says that productivity
advantage in a sector is associated with export success in that sector, a prediction
that arises from any number of partial-equilibrium supply and demand models (for
example, a simple Cournot reciprocal dumping model predicts that export success
will be negatively related to marginal cost).  The critique is not that (29) is
inconsistent with a Ricardian model, but that verification of ! > 0 is not evidence
in favor of Ricardo over any other explanation.  A truly general equilibrium
prediction of Ricardian models is that a productivity advantage in one sector can
actually hurt export success in another sector, but Golub and Hsieh do not
investigate this prediction.
The same critique applies to Choudhri and Schembri (2000), which looks at
US-Canada trade. Choudhri and Schembri integrate product differentiation into
the Ricardian model and derive their estimating equation carefully from theory,
but the end result is something similar to (29) above, which relates export success
in sector g to relative productivity in sector g.  As with Golub and Hsieh (2000),
they are silent on cross-productivity effects.29
2.4 Conclusions and Unfinished Business - Comparative Advantage
A decade of research on empirical models of comparative advantage has
made some progress:
1. We now have our first confirmation of the theory of comparative advantage
in its general, autarky price form (Bernhofen and Brown 2000).
2. Many papers have demonstrated that, at least for manufactured goods,
relative factor supplies are an important influence on specialization
(Harrigan 1995, 1997a, Bernstein-and Weinstein 1998, Schott 2000, and
Harrigan and Zakrajšek 2000).
3. Technological differences have been shown to be an important influence on
specialization (Harrigan 1997a). 
4. The simple even factor-proportions model pioneered by  Leamer (1984) is
too simple: output indeterminacy (Bernstein-Weinstein 1988), Ricardian
effects (Harrigan 1997), and multiple cones (Schott 2000) are all empirically
important.
All of the papers reviewed in this chapter have been guided by the view that
a careful application of theory is important when investigating the theory of
comparative advantage (perhaps this is partly in reaction to the prolonged,
confused response of the profession to Leontief's alleged paradox).
It goes without saying that whatever progress has been made, we are a long
way from fully understanding the determinants and empirical significance of
comparative advantage. Some of the open questions are
1. What is the role of transport costs, or distance more generally, in
determining specialization?
2. How do non-comparative advantage influences on specialization, such as
increasing returns, interact with technology and factor endowment
differences to determine specialization?
3. How are trade flows determined?  Is a simple model of preferences enough,
or do we need to model income effects and/or the demand for intermediate30
goods?
4. What is the appropriate unit of analysis in thinking about comparative
advantage?  Should we be studying broad industries, or concentrating on
firm or plant level models?
5. How can we measure and characterize the cross-sectional and time-series
distribution of factor prices and goods prices?
6. Is there evidence for general equilibrium effects of sectoral productivity
differences of the sort predicted by simple Ricardian models?
Some of these questions are addressed elsewhere in this volume, but empirical
research on comparative advantage is still a young and underdeveloped field. 
There is plenty of opportunity for good empirical work to continue to sharpen our
understanding of the relevance of our basic trade models.
3 The Gravity Equation
James Anderson began his 1979 article "A Theoretical Foundation for the
Gravity Equation" by saying that
Probably the most successful empirical trade device of the last
twenty-five years is the gravity equation (Anderson, 1979, page 106).
One could say the same thing today, as the gravity equation remains at the center
of a great deal of applied research on international trade.  Another thing that has
not changed since 1979 is that there is great uncertainty about the foundations of
the gravity model: what do we mean when we say that it "works", and why does it
work?  Recently there have been a few papers that try to empirically understand
gravity, and a review of this recent research on the foundations of gravity is the
focus of this section.
The gravity equation is so-named because it is a theory of trade volumes
which is analogous to the physical theory of gravity: trade between a pair of
countries depends positively on the product of economic size and negatively on
distance, just as the force of gravity between two bodies increases with the product31










where Mcd denotes the value of imports by country c from country d, Dcd is the
distance between the two countries, Y is a measure of economic size such as GDP,
and k is a constant. Introducing parameters which allow the elasticities of trade
volumes with respect to size and distance to differ from one does not change the
basic message. As it stands equation (29) is not an economic model, but it is
nevertheless plausible. Transport and other trade costs are certainly correlated with
distance, so distance will surely reduce trade. Equally obviously, trade between the
United States and Japan will probably be larger than trade between Estonia and
Portugal. Nevertheless, what is striking about equation (29) is that there is
apparently no role for comparative advantage: neither relative endowments nor 
relative technology levels enter the equation. It is this apparent lack of connection
to neoclassical trade theory that led to the widespread conclusion that the gravity
equation had no theoretical foundation. A related observation is that neoclassical
trade theory is generally not concerned with bilateral trade: in comparative
advantage models, a country's trade is determined by its differences from the rest
of the world, with no prediction about the pattern of bilateral trade.
Foundation or no, equation (29) fits the data remarkably well. Regressions
(in logarithms) of bilateral aggregate trade volumes on the GDP of trading partners
and the distance between them typically yield R
2's in the range of 0.65 to 0.95.
What is important about these high R
2's is that they have led many researchers to
use variants of the gravity equation as a benchmark for the volume of trade. This
gravity-based benchmark is then used to evaluate economic policy issues such as
the effects of protection (Harrigan 1993), openness (Lawrence 1987, Saxonhouse
1989, Harrigan 1996), the merits of proposed regional trade agreements (Frankel,32
Stein, and Wei 1997), and the effects of national borders (McCallum 1995, Evans
2000, Anderson and van Wincoop 2001). 
3.1 The Theory of Gravity
In fact, there are several theoretical foundations for the gravity model. One
of the earliest is due to Anderson (1979), with other contributions from Bergstrand
(1985, 1989). These models all have the feature that consumers regard goods as
being differentiated by location of production, a modeling trick known as the
"Armington assumption" (Armington, 1969). The standard specification for





















where ccd is consumption by country c residents of goods produced in country d,
and !d and $ are parameters which  are common across all countries.  The key
feature of these preferences is that goods are differentiated by country of origin
only. Another feature of this function is that the marginal utility of consumption of
goods from all countries d is always strictly positive, and infinite in the limit as
consumption goes to zero.  This implies that, whatever the price, country c will
consume at least some of every good from every country.
Anderson's and Bergstrand's models, and most other explanations for the
negative effect of distance on trade, assume that transport costs are of the
“iceberg” form, where for every t > 1 units shipped from the exporter, only 1 unit
arrives at the importer’s location, the other t-1 units having “melted” in transit. As
long as exporters do not price discriminate across export markets, there will be a
single f.o.b. price pd for country d's exports, and the c.i.f. price in country c of
imports from country d will be pdtcd. In empirical applications, t is usually assumed
to be a monotonically increasing function of distance. This way of handling17 The derivation here follows Deardorff (1998) and Anderson and van
Wincoop (2001).
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transport costs is ubiquitous not because it is realistic but because it is very handy:
as Grossman (1998) notes, 
...few would consider the “iceberg” formulation of shipping costs as
anything more than a useful trick for models with constant demand
elasticities, and possibly a good approximation to the technology for
shipping tomatoes (Grossman, 1988, pg. 30-31).
Hummels (1999) provides some evidence on the actual form of the relationship
between transport costs and distance, while a number of authors (including
Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2001))  have shown that there
are important fixed costs to trade which are independent of distance.
These reservations about the iceberg assumption notwithstanding, it is
crucial to deriving a closed-form gravity equation based on the preferences given
by (31)
17.  The basis of such derivations is the assumption that all goods are
traded, so that national income is the sum of traded goods output, which in
equilibrium is the sum of home and foreign demand for the unique good that the
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These equations can be solved in a way that will generate the gravity equation. 
Choosing units so that all f.o.b. prices are equal to unity and letting sc= Yc/Yw be c's


















This equation states that country c's national income depends on two things: first,
the popularity of the goods that it produces (the taste parameter !c) and second, a
GDP-weighted average of its distance from trading partners (assuming that
distance and transport costs are positively related).  The dependence of income on
!c is unattractive on economic grounds: is it really plausible that the United States
has a high GDP because consumers around the world have a taste for US goods? 
The negative effect of distance on income is much more believable, and is a
common implication of economic geography models (see, for instance, the chapter
in this volume by Overman, Redding and Venables).  
Solving the model (see Anderson and van Wincoop (2001)) for imports as a
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where Mcd is the c.i.f. value of imports by c from d.  The first and second terms are
easy to understand:  big countries import and export more than small countries,
and trade costs reduce trade volumes with an elasticity of (1-$).  The third term is35
a substitution effect: if  transport costs facing c are high on average so that Pc is
large, then c will import more from d. The fourth term varies across exporting
sources d and is increasing in a weighted average of d's transport costs: if d is on
average a long way from its trading partners, it will have a low f.o.b. price, so c
will import more. More succinctly, controlling for country size and bilateral
distance, trade will be higher between country pairs that are far from the rest of the
world than between country pairs that are close to the rest of the world. 
The relative distance effect explains why the theoretically-derived gravity
model of (36) differs from the simple gravity equation (30).  To better understand
this relative distance effect, consider a world of five equal-sized countries evenly
spaced along a line:
ABCDE
Country B will import more from country A than it will from country C, despite
the fact that B is an equal distance from both.  This is because A is so far from
everyone else that aggregate demand for its output will be low, resulting in an
f.o.b. export price lower than C's f.o.b. export price.  Therefore, B's c.i.f. import
prices will be lower from A than from C. 
The development of (36) makes heavy use of the CES and iceberg
assumptions, but the point that relative as well as absolute distance matters for
bilateral trade seems much more general.  As a consequence, gravity equations
which pool across bilateral pairs without controlling for relative distance are
misspecified in a potentially important way.  Structural estimation of (36) is
difficult because of the non-linear functional form of the price index terms and the
presence of the unknown parameters ! (for an application which imposes all the
structure of the model, see Anderson and Van Wincoop (2001)).  An intuitive if
ad-hoc proxy for the inverse of the price term defined by (33) can be developed by
taking $ = 2, replacing the unknown !'s with income shares, and choosing units so36










According to (37), centrality is a GDP-weighted average of the inverse of trade
costs.  By the logic of the CES gravity model developed above, bilateral trade
should be decreasing in the centrality of the two trading partners, since a central
location means there are many alternative nearby sources of supply for the
importer, and high demand and hence high f.o.b. prices for the exporter.  
Different proxies have been used by several authors in the literature,
including Helliwell (1997) and Wei (1996).  Wei defines the "remoteness index"










which is related in spirit to (33) but can not be derived from any simplification of











which makes little sense, since distance from small countries matters more than
distance from large countries in determining a country's remoteness. 
This discussion makes the point that controlling for relative distance is
crucial to estimating a well-specified gravity model, and that there are a number of
reasonable ways to measure relative distance (although Helliwell's index is not one
of them).  However, if consistent estimation of the distance effect ($ - 1) is what is
of interest, then researchers can impose the theory-required unit elasticities on37
income and run the following simple regression with country fixed effects:








where the %'s are dummy variables which sweep out the influence of importer and
exporter relative distance.
As a foundation for the gravity equation the Armington model just
described relies on some convenient functional form assumptions (icebergs and
CES) which can be criticized, but its biggest weakness is that there is no
microfoundation for the production side of the model, if one can even say that
there is a production side at all. It was left to the "new trade theory" of the 1980s
to provide a solid theoretical grounding for the production side of the gravity
equation. The monopolistic competition model (summarized elegantly in Helpman
and Krugman (1985)) provides just such a model for the zero transport costs case.
In the monopolistic competition model, a taste for variety interacts with firms who
face increasing returns to scale in the production of varieties. With identical,
homothetic CES preferences on the demand side and strong symmetry
assumptions on the supply side, the equilibrium of the Helpman-Krugman model
provides a rationalization for the Armington utility function (31), with the
parameters !c reinterpreted as proportional to the number of varieties produced in
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where   is country b's imports of good g from country c, sb is b's share of
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g M
world expenditure, and   is b's output of good g. Summing over all goods g
c
g x
gives the aggregate gravity model of equation (29) for k = 1/Y
w and Dbc = 1.  One
appealing aspect of equation (40) is that it gives predictions on a sectoral basis,
and so can be tested using sectoral data on production and trade.38
Extending the monopolistic competition model to the case of positive trade
costs is straightforward.  If all goods are produced in monopolistically competitive
sectors, then with CES preferences the equilibrium number of varieties per country
is invariant to trade costs (see Krugman 1980), and the model is isomorphic to the
Armington model above.  As a result, the gravity equation (36) follows
immediately. 
For the purposes of deriving a gravity equation, the key feature of the
Armington and monopolistic competition models is that goods are differentiated
by location of production, whether by assumption (Armington) or endogenously
(monopolistic competition).  Equivalently, countries are completely specialized in
disjoint sets of goods. In contrast, Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (1998, 2001)
consider whether it is possible to get a gravity-type relationship in a model of
trade in homogeneous goods.  Feenstra et al consider a general equilibrium model
of "reciprocal dumping", where Cournot-Nash oligopolists sell a homogeneous
good in each others' markets à la Brander and Krugman (1983).  The model is very
simple, with two countries sharing the same technology and a single factor of
production. To get analytical results they assume Cobb-Douglas preferences
(implying unit elasticity of market demand) and no transport costs in the
numeraire sector (guaranteeing factor price equalization).  In footnote 2 of
Feenstra et al (2001) they assert that Feenstra et al (1998) "derive and illustrate the
gravity equation for the reciprocal dumping model", but that is not quite right. 
The 1998 paper shows, in a two-country world, that the sum of world exports is
maximized when country size is equalized, a result that they call "the most
important implication of the 'gravity' equation" (Feenstra et al 1998, page 9), but
they do not show that bilateral imports or exports depend on the product of trading
partner GDPs, which is the usual statement of the gravity equation (equation (30)
above).  In fact, their reciprocal dumping model has some very un-gravity like
implications: bilateral trade is increasing in country size only over a limited range,
and two-way trade only occurs when countries are of similar size.39
A model of trade in homogeneous goods which does generate a gravity-type
relationship is developed in Eaton and Kortum (2001).  Their framework is a
multi-country perfectly competitive Ricardian model with a continuum of goods
and iceberg transport costs, a complex set of assumptions that nonetheless yields
intuitive and elegant implications.  The foundation of their modeling strategy is
the assumption that country c's productivity in g, 1/ac(g), is a random variable
drawn from the Frechet distribution function
(41) ( ) exp( ) cc Fa T a
θ − =−
where Tc has the interpretation of the absolute technology level in country c and
1/& is related to the dispersion of productivities across goods, and hence measures
the potential for comparative advantage.  Country c has wages wc, so c's unit cost











where ’cd > 1 is the iceberg transport factor between c and d.  But d will not
necessarily buy from c: it will only do so if c has the lowest c.i.f. price available in
d.  This will be more likely if c and d are close to each other, and if c is cost-
competitive in a wide range of goods. 
Prices in country d depend on technology and input costs in the rest of the











This price index is increasing in weighted distance: it is higher if you are a long
way from countries with good technology (that is, high Ti's).  For & = 1 it bears a40
family resemblance to the  centrality index of  equation (37) above, which
confirms in a very different model the general point that relative distance matters
for trade flows. A few more steps gives d's imports from c:










This is starting to look a lot like a gravity equation, and in fact Eaton and Kortum
show that it reduces to the frictionless gravity equation Mdc = kYcYd when there are
no transport costs.  More generally, national income in c will depend on absolute
advantage Tc and on c's location in the world, summarized by Pc, as well as the
national endowment of labor.  Therefore, just as in the Armington model of  (36)
above, bilateral trade in this Ricardian model depends on country size, distance,
and relative distance.  But the effect of distance here is very different than in the
Armington model: rather than reduce the volume of a given set of country c goods
that are consumed, distance shrinks the set of goods that d chooses to buy from c. 
In the equilibrium of the model, many countries produce and export the same
goods, but they do not sell in the same markets: if a country imports a good it will
generally do so from just one source. As such, Eaton and Kortum challenge the
view that complete specialization is a necessary condition for the gravity equation.
3.2 Why does Gravity work? Discriminating among alternative explanations
We now have plenty of evidence for the aggregate gravity equation and
plenty of theoretical foundations for it. Is Deardorff (1998) correct that, with so
many potential fathers, we can not determine the gravity equation’s paternity? 
Deardorff's view is supported by the results of Hummels and Levinsohn (1995),
who found that gravity worked just as well for poor countries as it did for rich18 See Debaere (2000) for a critique of Hummels and Levinsohn.  Debaere
argues that the Hummels and Levinsohn data are friendlier to the monopolistic
competition model than they thought. 
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countries
18.  They argued that this was a surprise, since the production side of the
monopolistic competition model (which they took to be the foundation of gravity)
is likely to be appropriate for rich, but not poor, countries.  A number of recent
papers argue that Deardorff was too pessimistic, but empirically selecting among
the potential explanations for gravity is still at a relatively early stage.
Most of the evidence that "gravity works" comes from aggregate data,
where total bilateral trade is regressed on GDP.  This is despite the fact that the
models developed to explain gravity often apply also at the sectoral level (see
equation (40)).  Given this, it is surprising how little work has been done on
examining disaggregated gravity equations, or on looking for instances where
gravity fails. One recent attempt to do so is Haveman and Hummels (2001), who
examine a large data set of bilateral trade flows at the 4-digit SITC level. The most
striking result in this paper is the number of bilateral zeros: most potential bilateral
trades in a given SITC code do not occur. In particular, when a country imports a
good it usually imports it from only one source, and when a country exports a
good it usually exports it to a limited number of countries. This pattern could be
rationalized by a model of product differentiation with non-CES preferences
and/or fixed costs to transporting goods (although no-one has solved such a
model), but it is certainly at odds with the standard gravity model specification
which assumes symmetric CES preferences and iceberg transportation costs.  A
large number of zeros is explicitly predicted by the Ricardian model of Eaton and
Kortum (2001), which is one of the few predictions about gravity from that model
which differ from the gravity predictions of complete specialization models.  The
Eaton-Kortum model can also be expected to work just as well for poor countries
that produce homogeneous goods as it does for rich countries, so the Hummels-
Levinsohn critique of the excessively good performance of gravity does not apply42
to the Eaton-Kortum model.
Another paper which looks at disaggregated gravity predictions is Feenstra
et al (2001).  The authors present a series of simple models that generate gravity-
like equations, that is, where both importer and exporter GDP help to explain
bilateral trade.  The theory models predict that where there is free entry there will
be home-market effects, that is, exports will be more than proportional to GDP. 
This implies that the effect of exporter GDP will be larger than the effect of
importer GDP in a gravity equation.  Conversely, when there are barriers to entry,
there is a reverse home market effect, so the effect of exporter GDP will be smaller
than the effect of importer GDP in a gravity equation.  The empirical implication
is that the GDP elasticities in a gravity equation should be different depending on
whether or not there are entry barriers, and the empirical problem is that there are
no internationally comparable barriers on sectoral entry barriers.  They proceed
under the hypothesis that different types of goods might have different types of
entry barriers, which would imply different gravity equation coefficients for
different types of goods.  This is exactly what they find: using a classification
scheme due to Rauch (1999), they find large and precisely estimated differences in
the GDP coefficients in the gravity equation across differentiated, 'reference
priced', and homogeneous goods.  Some illustrative results, from 1990, are given
in the following table:
Gravity Equation Estimates for Different Types of Goods
Differentiated Reference Priced Homogeneous
Exporter GDP 1.12 0.91 0.54
Importer GDP 0.72 0.74 0.81
Source: Feenstra et al (2001), Table 2.
The interpretation of these results is not straightforward, because of the limitations
of the theory and because there is no direct evidence on entry barriers. 43
Nonetheless, the results are striking and thought provoking, and suggest that
further research on how gravity works for different types of trade flows will be
fruitful.
Feenstra et al disaggregate one side of the gravity equation, but not the
other: their disaggregated imports are always explained by importer and exporter
GDP.  A different approach is based on equation (40) above, which states that
sectoral trade flows depend on importer GDP (demand) and exporter sectoral
output (supply).  If  (40) held true for all sectors, then the ratio of trade to output in












where Mg and xg are the intra-group totals of trade and output of good g.  Harrigan
(1996) calculates that this predicted ratio is about 0.5 among the OECD countries
in 1985, and shows that the actual ratio of trade to output is much less than 0.5 and
varies by a factor of ten across manufacturing industries:44











Printing and publishing 0.03
Source: from Harrigan (1996), Table 1.
 
This table suggests some sector-specific explanations for trade volumes: the high
volume of trade in leather shoes and transport equipment seems to fit the product
differentiation story, while the low volume of trade in cement and publishing are
probably due to transport costs (cement is heavy) and home-biased tastes
(Frenchmen read few books published in English) respectively.  Whatever the
sector-specific explanations, the large cross-sector variation in trade relative to
output suggests that empirical work on understanding the volume of trade should
work with disaggregated data.
Harrigan (1994) was the first to look at equations like (40) in the context of
trying to understand the performance of the gravity model, arguing that
monopolistic competition predicts that the volume of trade will be higher in
sectors characterized by scale economies.  The specification in that paper is flawed
since it fails to control for bilateral distance, but it is notable that Harrigan finds a
fairly robust result that the volume of bilateral trade is higher in sectors with larger
scale economy proxies. 19 While Lai and Trefler claim that their paper casts light on the
monopolistic competition model, in fact their model takes sectoral production as
given, and should therefore be regarded as a general gravity equation in which the
Armington and monopolistic competition models are isomorphic. 
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Like Harrigan (1996), Lai and Trefler (1999) estimate sectoral gravity
equations, but they are much more careful than Harrigan was to use all the
structure given by the CES functional form assumption
19.  In addition to using the
model for policy analysis, they focus on how well the model fits at a sectoral level. 
To control for distance and other time-invariant influences on bilateral trade, they
use panel data with country-pair fixed effects.  The fixed effects strategy has the
usual advantages and disadvantages: it gives consistent estimates of the
parameters of interest but discards the overwhelming majority of the variation in
the data, which is in the cross-section of country pairs.  They find that the
correlation between fitted and actual trade volumes is highest for industries where
(they claim) the monopolistic competition model is more appropriate, but they
make no attempt to formally identify which industries "should" fit the model's
predictions.  In their Figure 3, they show that all the hard work in dealing with the
CES price term makes no difference to model fit: dropping the price term gives the
same correlation as including it.  They also confirm in Figure 3 that the fit is
largely driven by the output terms on the right hand side, that is, the gravity effect
on the supply side.  They refer to this as a data identity, but that is not correct: the
presence of sectoral output in a disaggregated gravity equation reflects the
assumption that products are differentiated.  Their final conclusion is that the
gravity model doesn't work nearly as well when it is scrutinized at a sectoral level:
among other anomalies, the volume of trade is less than predicted, the elasticity of
trade with respect to partner production is not one, and the CES structure adds
little to a more naive specification.
A paper which argues that we can use aggregate data to see why gravity
works is Evenett and Keller (2001).  Their approach is to derive the aggregate
gravity model using several simple textbook trade models, and then see whether46
gravity works better in sub-samples of country pairs that are thought to better fit
the presumptions of the different models.  Unfortunately, their results are not
informative about why gravity works for several reasons.  Most importantly, they
work with two-country frictionless models, which have no predictions for bilateral
trade in a many-country world where trade costs matter.  Secondarily, they use
intraindustry trade indices to stratify their sample, despite the demonstrations by
Davis (1995, 1997) that the proportion of intraindustry trade has nothing to do
with the causes of gross trade volumes. 
3.3 Conclusions and Unfinished Business - Gravity 
Despite being a staple of applied analysis because it "works well", the
gravity model has been subject to surprisingly little empirical testing.  Some of the
facts that the papers reviewed in the previous section have uncovered can be
summarized as follows: 
1. There are many zero observations in disaggregated bilateral trade.
2. The volume of trade is much smaller than predicted by the frictionless
gravity model.
3. Relative, as well as absolute, distance and trade costs matter for
understanding bilateral trade in a multi-country world.
4. The elasticity of trade with respect to output differs from one and is
not uniform across goods.  These differences may be related to the
type of good and/or market structure. 
5. The CES model of preferences doesn't fit the data.
6. The ratio of trade to output varies by an order of magnitude across
industries.
7. There is some evidence that the volume of trade is higher in sectors
characterized by monopolistic competition and/or scale economies.
This list raises more questions than it answers.  What explains the zeros?  Why is
the volume of trade to output so small, and why is there so much variation in it? 
What model of consumption might improve on CES?  Is it really the case that the47
volume of trade is higher in industries with scale economies? No doubt the astute
reader can think of other questions left unanswered, and perhaps ambitious readers
will try to answer them.
4 General Conclusions
This chapter has surveyed a decade's worth of empirical research on how
well the data obey the laws of comparative advantage and gravity.  Detailed
conclusions from the survey are summarized in sections 2.4 and 3.3.
Given the centrality of comparative advantage and gravity to applied
international economics, it is surprising that there has not been more empirical
research, and sobering if not frustrating that progress has been so slow.  A clear
message from this chapter is that, while we have learned something about how
specialization and the volume of trade are determined, there are large gaps in our
knowledge.  The opportunities for future researchers to help fill these gaps are
equally large.48
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